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This article discusses a model of local governance referred to here as
‘participatory security’, in which citizens are held responsible for main-
taining urban security by participating in municipal programmes. I argue
that the goals of universal ‘inclusion’ through democratic ‘participation’
are undermined by political ideologies espousing both rights and respon-
sibilities of citizenship. Through ethnographic cases from highland Peru,
in which city centre neighbourhoods and peripheral zones are expected
to participate in markedly different fashions, I demonstrate how the
discourse of responsibilities translates into differential participation and
effectively institutionalises the layered imbalances of urban citizenship in
new and highly consequential ways.
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Glossy posters hanging in district municipal offices in the highland provincial capital
of Ayacucho, Peru, continuously remind visitors of the governing national policies of
‘citizen participation’ (Figure 1). The cartoonish cast of characters – generically repre-
senting a culturally (and presumably socially) diverse but united nation – is involved in
what can only be assumed to be ‘labouring for the good of the community’. Displayed
through an assortment of font, colour, italics, and bold prints, the text reads: ‘I exercise
my citizenship with responsibility. I fulfil my duties and demand my rights!’. This decep-
tively simple and potent declarative statement also seems to suggest that this communal
labour – framed as a literal embodiment of citizenship – is also essential to the health of
the nation and its common good. The imagery and the text, together, further emphasise
the explicit ways in which current models of governance tie democratic responsibility
to the twin concepts of derechos y deberes (the rights and duties of citizenship).
The appropriation and modification of civil participation to emphasise the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship has been particularly effective as an official political
strategy within Peru’s contemporary apparatus of Seguridad Ciudadana (Citizen Secu-
rity). These new national policies and local ordinances implicate the entire community
in the duties of maintaining urban security, circulating the rhetoric of shared respon-
sibility through abundant government slogans such as Seguridad Ciudadana, Tarea de
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Figure 1. ‘Derechos y Deberes’ Poster Displayed in the Jesu´s Nazareno District Municipality
Source: photo by author.
Notes: The words ‘exercise’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘responsibility’ are in bold font; ‘citizenship’, ‘duties’, and
‘rights’ are in red.
Todos ‘(Citizen Safety, Everybody’s Task)’. On the surface, the participatory turn in
contemporary processes of urbanisation seems to extend and deepen the reach of urban
citizenship. The ideology that drives participatory security programmes asserts that by
participating in local governance, all citizens are capable of shaping, cultivating, and
securing their own community’s well-being. Participating in urban governance, it is
implied, in turn strengthens a universal urban citizenship.
In this article, I analyse ethnographic cases of inequitable community participation
in Ayacucho’s municipal security programmes, and I use these to challenge the official
conception of citizenship that presumes an idealised and uncomplicated equation
by which democratic rights and responsibilities assure social equality and inclusion.
These municipal security programmes are part of an emerging model of what I
call participatory security: a broad political strategy for governing urban security
through the mechanisms of democratic participation. The term participatory security is
intended to draw attention to the complicated relationships between the doctrines of
citizen security and the philosophies underpinning participatory democracy. Through
contrasting experiences of participation, I demonstrate how participatory security
programmes instead project unequal expectations upon diverse urban communities.
The remarkable geography of participation that has emerged in Ayacucho as a result
does not simply mean that peripheral and centre communities organise and participate
separately; it means that they participate differently. Moreover, only after participating
in these particular ways are marginal communities able to demand and receive the
attention of the municipal security apparatus.
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The language of participation is not entirely new to Peru; it was converted into
everyday currency through a complex trajectory of governmental aid policies designed
by highly centralised governments, particularly those of Juan Velasco (1968–1975)
and Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). However, as detailed below, the contemporary
democratic model is distinguished by the explicit incorporation of citizen responsibilities
and duties. These unequal responsibilities are carefully evaluated within municipal
decisions about the allocation of finite resources. Assessing the possibility of municipal
support for security work in the city’s outlying areas, for example, then-director of
Citizen Security, Jose´ Antonio Antezana, stated categorically: ‘but first, we want to
see that the population and the neighbourhood organisations meet their responsibilities
as citizens’ (interview, 2007). Accordingly, in order for communities in the urban
periphery to fully benefit from government services for urban security – ranging from
police support to municipal radios – they were first expected to participate in security
efforts, most notably through their own manual labour.
Alongside the ideology of inclusion, ‘participation’ simultaneously functions as
a strong organisational model, not only of governmental tasks and priorities but
also of social differences, extending the well-worn paths of class and racial divides.
As Ayacucho’s local security officials define the role of civil participation in their
programmes, they differentiate responsibilities based on an assumed divide between
the spatially compact city centre (referred to as the casco urbano) and the sprawling
peripheral districts (referred to as the city’s ‘belt’, the cinturo´n de la ciudad). While this
divide between city centre and urban periphery is partially a logistical component of
localised neighbourhood organisation within the participatory system, it is also a heavily
ideological divide permeated by histories of social inequality. Although some surprising
alliances emerge in the new social contours of these participatory security programmes,
the centre/periphery divide is a powerful – and uncontested – organising principle in large
part because it mirrors the politically potent and deeply ingrained social differentiations
well-known to the region: a city centre inhabited by the traditional urban elite, and
a much more expansive periphery, the marginal urban zones that swelled in size as
they incorporated the thousands of rural migrants during and after Peru’s internal war
with the Maoist insurgent group Shining Path (1980–2000). Thus the communities that
are geographically peripheral to the city’s historic centre are also marked as socially
marginal, associated by those in power with the indigenous, Quechua-speaking, rural
hinterlands rather than the historical networks of regional power emanating from
the city. Lacking roots within the urban power structures, these migrants are in turn
marked as recent urban citizens. This narrative of the social and political history of the
city continues to shape the expectations for the marginalised peripheral communities:
held differentially responsible for undesirable urban changes, including increased urban
insecurity, these populations are in turn expected to participate differentially to solve
those urban problems. Layered onto this troubled narrative is Ayacucho’s profound
stigma as the birthplace of the Shining Path. This history catapulted the city into a
symbolically significant position in the country’s perceptions of insecurity, and thus into
a unique role in the development of national policies regarding civil participation in
urban security measures.
Contrary to the glossy images and slogans depicting a nation labouring together
for the common good, the unequal labour of participation expected within Ayacucho’s
participatory security programmes results in communities and individuals that embody
citizenship differently, both literally and figuratively. Jose´ Bengoa pointedly observed
that ‘the map of exclusion goes hand-in-hand with the map of citizen security’
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(Bengoa, 2000: 53); in fact, I argue that the inequitable map of citizenship becomes
further entrenched through these participatory security programmes. Rather than uni-
versalism and inclusivity, we see how the practices of ‘participation’ instead foster
relationships that much more closely resemble the disjunctive citizenship identified by
Holston and Caldeira (1998) and Holston and Appadurai (1999). I argue that the
rhetoric of citizenship being deployed in these security programmes – in which urban
communities are said to possess duties or responsibilities – is deeply divisive to the urban
social and political fabric of the city, and effectively institutionalises social inequality
through the established paths of participation.
Urban Security and Civil Participation in Ayacucho
The concept of seguridad ciudadana (citizen security) appeared across Latin America in
the late 1990s, broadly encompassing ‘threats to public, social, and political order posed
by rising common crime and fear of crime’ (Neild, 1999: 1). In Peru, seguridad ciudadana
stood alone as an organising principle by 2003, when it became national politics through
the creation of the National Citizen Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad
Ciudadana, SINASEC) (Congreso de la Repu´blica del Peru´, 2003), mandating the
formation of local offices and committees throughout the country. Around the same
time, the United Nations was embracing the new concept of human security, defined as
freedom from want and freedom from fear (Commission on Human Security, 2003).
Although the concept of seguridad ciudadana, at least as formulated in Peru, was less
abstract than that of human security, and intended to address urban crime and violence
in a more direct way, they both mark a sharp departure from traditional policies
of state or national security. The re-conceptualised social and political keyword of
citizen security was encoded with other concepts of freedom and universal rights, and
positioned to represent the concrete as well as intangible elements of the public good.
Perhaps even more significant, Peru’s model of citizen security was fundamentally
inseparable from the simultaneous reformulation of participacio´n ciudadana (citizen
participation): the soul of the citizen security paradigm involved not just a shift
to emphasise individual securities but, more importantly, an ideology of collective
responsibility and organisation under a transitional democracy. This new paradigm for
governing urban security champions a model of participatory democracy that frames the
tasks of governance as shared responsibilities between government institutions and local
citizens. Indeed, the team who originally designed the country’s citizen security paradigm
held as a guiding principle that ‘without the participation of the citizenry, insecurity
cannot be confronted’ (Costa and Basombrío Iglesias, 2004: 68). By referring to this
new paradigm as participatory security, I highlight the deep ideological, philosophical,
and legislative connections that were forged between the nascent Citizen Security System
and the popular ideals of democratic participation.
As in other Latin American countries (cf. Este´vez, 2001; Dammert, 2006), the
development of Peru’s National Citizen Security System was accompanied by significant
institutional developments, with newly defined organisational structures and broad-
stroke policies. The redirected priorities and configurations channel the allocation
of resources and, equally important, work to mobilise different political actors and
establish particular social and political relationships. As such, citizen security is much
more than a doctrine (a set of political beliefs, priorities, and laws); it is formalised
and institutionalised as a government system (a set of concrete political imperatives and
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structured relationships). As both doctrine and system, Peru’s citizen security apparatus
is highly significant precisely because it was intentionally imagined and designed to
promote the new national priority of democratic participation. The momentum gained
by the model of participatory security, however, was facilitated by deep historical
intersections between urban social organisation and the missions of urban security. This
was particularly true for Ayacucho, with its unique relationship between participation
and security.
A foundational moment in the development of Peru’s official discourse of ‘participa-
tion’ was president Juan Velasco’s participatory revolution (1968–1975), complete with
slogans such as ‘A Society in Full Participation’ and a national agency (Sistema Nacional
de Apoyo a la Movilizacio´n Social, SINAMOS) charged with promoting participation
in government programmes (cf. Franco, 1975; Dietz, 1998; Stokes, 1995). Two decades
later, Alberto Fujimori’s government (1990–2000) rejuvenated a complex system of
participation through aid programmes that were aimed predominantly at calming the
increasingly aggressive demands for basic services in marginalised communities (cf. Burt,
2004; Remy, 2005; Scho¨nwa¨lder, 2002). The current model of democratic participation
is imagined in stark contrast to the policies of Fujimori and his predecessors: instead
of what critics refer to as asistencialismo, (dependence upon temporary band-aid hand-
outs), it is said to give citizens – especially in marginal neighbourhoods – a political and
social obligation to take control of the betterment of their community.
With the country embroiled in a protracted internal war with Shining Path, Fujimori’s
articulation of participatory programmes established a complex relationship with
concerns of security. Under the guise of security and social order, Fujimori’s centralised
government initially tightened their control over popular organisations by infiltrating
local groups, arresting youth suspected of gang activity, and launching accusations
of terrorism against the most radical civil organisations. In later years, Fujimori
began to modify this policy, co-opting local organisations by constructing clientelistic
relationships with the centralised state (Blondet and Trivelli, 2004). As Fujimori’s
popularity began to wane at the end of his second term, his government recalibrated
the link between security and popular participation in local governance. Specifically, by
reshaping the rhetoric of social pacification, Fujimori devised programmes to incorporate
local communities into security policies through neighbourhood organisations. In this
process, Ayacucho’s local history of neighbourhood organisation diverges sharply with
that documented in Lima and other parts of the country. Central to the new security plans
was an aggressive campaign to recognise the indispensible role of the rondas campesinas
(peasant patrols) in the internal conflict. Simultaneously, however, the government was
systematically disarming these organisations. As part of this delicate dance, Fujimori
developed a semi-experimental programme creating rondas urbanas (urban patrols), in
which city neighbourhoods were militarily trained to protect security and order in their
own communities. The country’s first formally recognised urban ronda was registered
in Ayacucho’s ‘Covadonga’ shantytown (Vivas, 1999). While the organisational model
for these urban programmes drew directly from the experiences with the rural rondas,
featuring rotating community patrols and local justice, the formalised programmes in
Ayacucho were distinguished by an expanded working relationship with the Peruvian
military (interviews with interviewee 1, 2004; interviewee 3, 2004). With rigorous
training by military leaders, young men could count two years of service to their
community’s ronda as fulfilment of their obligatory military service. However, in 1999,
military service was made voluntary and almost instantaneously a core incentive for
participation in the urban rondas was removed.
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In Ayacucho, the 1999 change in military code coincided with local municipal
legislation officially implementing the formation of ‘juntas vecinales’ (neighbourhood
organisations) (proposed nationally in 1981). Within a couple of years, the new
organisational model replaced the short-lived ronda experiment. Unlike the rondas,
who responded to military command, the new juntas receive minimal support from
municipal offices and the National Police, and largely function autonomously and
democratically. For many local ronda urbana leaders, reorganising into the new system
of juntas vecinales was a disillusion, as they were rendered completely powerless and
unsupported (interviews with interviewee 2, 2004; interviewee 5, 2005).
The new urban junta vecinal structure extended the legislation establishing munic-
ipal offices of Neighbourhood Participation and Citizen Participation. Together, this
legislative package formalised the relationships between neighbourhood organisations
and municipal institutions. As such, it facilitated the mandate of the National Citi-
zen Security System, according to which provincial citizen security committees must
‘promote the organisation of juntas vecinales in their jurisdiction’. Locally, Ayacucho’s
Provincial Citizen Security Committee stated definitively that its objective, vision, and
mission all serve to reduce common crime and hazards with the participation of civil
society (Comite´ Provincial de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2004). The alliances between new
and existing programmes and institutions of participation were crucial to the impact
that the new participatory security paradigm had on the government’s efforts to redefine
urban citizenship as dependent upon collective efforts to promote and maintain security,
now identified squarely within the realm of the ‘public good’.
Where the contemporary language of participation differs markedly from previous
legislation is in the symbolic emphasis on democratic responsibilities, or on the rights and
duties of citizenship. This conscientious politics of citizen responsibilities hinges upon
what are considered the vestiges of populism lingering in previous conceptualisations
of participation as merely rights that citizens could demand. The legal parameters of
citizen participation have been modified to emphasise that citizens have rights and
government has responsibility, but also that government responsibility has limits and
citizens have responsibilities. When this philosophy of citizen rights and responsibilities
is put into practice, governmental participation programmes can be leveraged as a
means of transference of political responsibility from government agencies to civil
organisations. This is similar to what Julia Paley refers to as the ‘paradoxes of
participation’ (Paley, 2001), in which participation motivates a population by providing
a sense of meaning to citizenship while simultaneously limiting public action. In
this way, participation can function as a hegemonic control mechanism by which
governments – sometimes deliberately – alleviate themselves of certain responsibilities
by expecting civil organisations to carry out those tasks.
Despite well-meaning and democratic intentions, the powerful ideology of the com-
mon good was, in practice, anything but common, since the inequitable allocation of
rights corresponds directly to the inequitable allocation of responsibility to solve prob-
lems of urban insecurity. Official slogans claiming that citizen security is everybody’s
task explicitly position both citizen participation and urban security as critical compo-
nents to the country’s democratic transition. As Jorge Antonio Antezana, Ayacucho’s
then-director of Citizen Security explained, he saw his primary responsibility to be
not only eliminating insecurity in the city but, in fact, making the population aware
of (concientizar) their democratic responsibilities as citizens (interview, 2007). These
democratic responsibilities are not universal, however, since citizen participation is
valued and promoted differently across urban neighbourhoods.
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As evident in the ethnographic scenes analysed below, the relationship between
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship becomes increasingly unequal through the
very definition of urban insecurity as a social problem, and as connections are drawn
between causal responsibility for the insecurity and political responsibility for solving
it (cf. Gusfield, 1981: 12). A core principle of Ayacucho’s local participatory security
programmes is that in addition to punitive control measures, any successful long-term
strategy primarily involves prevention. Prevention, as formulated by the Provincial
Municipality, includes everything from coordinated patrols to public awareness cam-
paigns aimed at recuperating values and cultivating a culture of peace (cf. Comite´
Provincial de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2004; interview with G. Miranda Gutie´rrez, 2007).
As the urban periphery is continually assumed to be the cause for the city’s security
crisis, these marginalised communities are held disproportionately responsible for the
tasks of prevention, such as performing night patrols and constructing their own com-
munity centres. City centre organisations, meanwhile, are engaged in the repressive
measures of securing order, such as observing police interventions, filing police reports,
and holding officials publicly accountable for enforcing laws. The mechanisms of the
participatory security apparatus – which distinguish repressive and preventative strate-
gies – grate against the idealistic goals of universal integration into urban society by
differentially allocating the ‘responsibilities’ of urban citizenship.
Ethnography of ‘Participatory Security’
Enforcing Security in the Urban Periphery
On a sunny Sunday morning in 2005, hundreds of residents of Los Olivos, one of the
sprawling neighbourhoods on the far southeast side of the city, were gathered for a
faena (communal work party). They were preparing a newly-acquired dirt plot for the
construction of a community centre, and it was dusty and hot as they worked with
picks and shovels, women and men, young and old, together (Figure 2).
After several hours, the president of the Residents’ Association called an end to
the heavy labour and began a general meeting of the relatively new neighbourhood
organisation. As the group formed a circle, the president launched into a plea for
greater participation from the neighbourhood members in the affairs of the association.
He reminded them emphatically of the risks associated with being community lead-
ers trying to ‘do something for our zone’. They received frequent threats and ‘could
die at any moment’, he said, and they needed everybody to get involved (meter la
mano), to demonstrate dedication, commitment, enthusiasm, and ‘love’. Today is not
like yesteryear, he continued, when ‘everything was obligation and punishment’ from
community elders. Today ‘we live in a democracy’, and the wellbeing of Los Olivos
depends not upon a few leaders but upon the voluntary labour ‘for the pueblo’, with
everybody participating enthusiastically.
Los Olivos reaches into the most marginalised geographic corners of the city, one
of the many urban expanses that were barely illuminated at night and serviced by only
a few wide and dusty unpaved arteries. It is located in the district municipality of San
Juan Bautista, infamous for its reputation as the most dangerous district of the city.
Central on the agenda that day was a discussion about strategies that Los Olivos could
adopt for guaranteeing security. This agenda was propelled by the emotional appeals
of the young man who worked as the sole night patrol for the zone, ‘risking his life’ in
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Figure 2. Faena (Work Party) to Construct a Community Centre, Los Olivos
Source: photo by author.
confrontations every night with gang members and drunks. He had come to the meeting
because his boss refused to pay him, saying that residents of Los Olivos were not paying
their monthly quota for the security service. By the end of the meeting the options were
clear: either community members could vote to pay monthly quotas to continue hiring
the security service, or they could opt to organise themselves in nightly patrols for their
own neighbourhood security, as they had done for years in the past and as other areas
continued to do.
Throughout the conversation, the two options were repeatedly framed within the
discourse of responsibility and the need to organise in order to fight for their own
community’s needs. The representative of the municipality’s security forces (and fellow
resident) explained in detail how it was up to residents to use the whistles provided
by the municipality when there was a problem, to ‘surround a thief from all sides so
he can’t escape’. Someone else grabbed a two-way radio provided by the municipality
and called the central command to demonstrate that they indeed worked. Nonetheless,
another member in charge of neighbourhood security warned: ‘we can’t wait for the
authorities to take care of our problems, everybody has to help, don’t wait for the whip
to be thrown like old times!’
Underlying the security meeting was the assumption that local problems will not
be solved by the municipality or other government institutions. Police and district
serenazgo (security forces) were viewed as only secondary affairs – they are necessary
for subsequent formal procedures but cannot be relied upon for the critical tasks of
protecting the neighbourhood and assuring security and order. Residents of Los Olivos
are proud of their past successes in reducing the common crime and gang activities that
were rampant in the early years, when it was first populated and considered a no-man’s
land. They now claimed to have not a single active gang in their zone, having instead
incorporated former members into the community’s many grassroots organisations and
© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Latin American Research © 2012 Society for Latin American Studies
Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 31, No. 2 181
Kairos Marquardt
youth groups. Moreover, in the eyes of local organisers, this success was achieved
largely through their own efforts, with minimal outside assistance.
The security practices discussed in this Los Olivos meeting fit squarely into municipal
conceptions of ideal forms of participation. The high value placed upon these activities
reflects the local government’s broader approach to civil participation, in which local
control is an integral part of the ‘participatory security’ strategies. In the world of
circulating statistics about insecurity in Ayacucho, one of the most-repeated concerned
the 300 police officers allocated for the entire metropolitan city. This dreadfully small
police force was barely enough, the argument went, for protecting the city centre and
it was certainly not sufficient to reach the peripheral areas. Thus the city relied heavily
upon district security forces, but these were equally undersized: San Juan Bautista
was home to over 35,000 residents but boasted only six individuals in their district
serenazgo. Chronically under-staffed, district security forces in turn depended upon the
kind of coordinated local security work (mainly at night) that was being negotiated in
the Los Olivos meeting.
San Juan Bautista was the first district in the city to establish a serenazgo force in
1998, two years before the provincial municipality established theirs (Municipalidad
Provincial de Huamanga, 2000). From its initial conception, it was designed to function
as a joint effort between the municipality and organised civil groups. The whistles and
radios given to the Association in Los Olivos were examples of the precious resources
that the provincial municipality reserved for the most trusted and depended-upon
neighbourhood organisations. Nonetheless, persistent funding gaps in municipal security
programmes continue to be filled by coordinated grassroots work, particularly through
neighbourhood-organised fundraisers to purchase the additional supplies necessary to
outfit their night patrols (interview with interviewee 4, 2005). In fact, initially all district
residents were required to pay monthly dues for the security operation (La Calle, 1998),
and the specific amount varied according to the individual’s residency zone.
These governmental policies officially mandating community security work were
designed around a powerful belief in the direct correlations between those marginal
communities and the city’s insecurity. As common crime and gangs emerged in the
city’s public consciousness in the late 1990s, it was immediately associated with the
barrios (the expanding marginal communities largely populated by then-recent migrants
to the city), and the torn social fabric resulting from the years of civil war with the
Shining Path (cf. Vergara Figueroa and Condori Castillo, 2007). The prevalence at
that time of this association is evident in the inaugural issue of a local magazine,
which included statements from ‘people on the street’ about youth crime: ‘It all
originates in the barrios[. . .]. They are the culprits of this social disgrace[. . .]. There
didn’t used to be delinquents’ (Somos, 1997). Reminiscent of racist ideologies linking
rural and indigenous peoples to inherently non-rational, instinctive, and often violent
behaviour (cf. Poole, 1994; de la Cadena, 2000), the urban poor are also portrayed
as perpetuating lawlessness (cf. Aguirre, 2005; Goldstein, 2004). In other words, it is
not simply that youth delinquents live in the outlying neighbourhoods but that those
peripheral – marginal – neighbourhoods produce delinquency and other social disgraces.
Peripheral neighbourhoods are, in this way, ideologically, socially, and politically
marked as causally responsible for the city’s public safety problems. This logic asserts
that because the urban periphery is the source of the city’s insecurity, its residents hold a
unique responsibility to solve the security problems through the preventative measures
of the citizen security apparatus. Limited budgets notwithstanding, the coordinated
relationships between grassroots organisations and government security programmes
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institutionalise pervasive and long-standing forms of discrimination and marginalisation
precisely because of the expectations that marginalised communities participate by
enforcing urban security through their own manual labour, from building community
centres to performing night patrols.
Paradoxically, the same stereotypes linking marginalised communities to the city’s
torn social fabric further justified discriminatory security policies by suggesting that this
unequal system was more effective at maintaining security. Specifically, these prejudge-
ments informed a common belief that organisations in the periphery are better organised,
more committed, and more motivated to participate. Reflecting an ideology about poor
communities and migrant populations, the theory suggests that residents of the periph-
eral neighbourhoods need to organise in order to survive, or that they organise because
they have more to lose than the complacent city centre residents. An urban version of
the essentialised characteristics of lo andino adds a further overlay, providing a pseudo-
historical justification for over-reliance on local labour in the urban periphery. This is
plainly visible in the 2001 legislation launching the Participation of Neighbourhood Self-
Development Organisations (Municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga, 2001). Through
the language of underdevelopment in marginalised communities, this ordinance cele-
brates the virtues of a hardworking population with high moral and ethical virtues who
are concerned about the wellbeing of the community, and stipulates that the foundation
of the self-development work carried out in peripheral neighbourhoods is communal
work, or obligatory active participation in the faenas (work parties) and journadas
(scheduled shifts) as well as participating actively in the work of citizen security.
Given the long history of antagonism in Peru between civil organisations in
marginalised urban areas and the various local and national government entities, it
might seem ironic, at first glance, that the civic activities found in the peripheral
neighbourhoods, such as Los Olivos are, at least in certain contexts, considered such
exemplary forms of participation. Indeed, a common line of argument in Ayacucho
reasons that civil organisations in peripheral areas (such as communal kitchens or
Mothers’ Clubs) were converted by Fujimori into mere distributors of centralised clien-
telist government control, recycling the misery through populist relationships. Within
NGO and government sectors, meanwhile, these organisations are framed as examples
par excellence of the possibilities and potentials of democracy to incorporate barrio
residents in governance through participatory venues (cf. Blondet and Trivelli, 2004).
Yet another line of analysis argues that the democratically elected government of Ale-
jandro Toledo (2001–2006) sought to disassociate these aid programmes from previous
populist politics by eliminating the payouts to participants; in so doing, an ideology
espousing that it is not good to simply give handouts to the poor was transformed into
the expectation that poor urban residents (and women in particular) should volunteer
their time to projects aimed at improving their neighbourhoods (Mortensen, 2010).
The legislative manoeuvres mandating coordination with local organisations in
the periphery amount to the official outsourcing of the most demanding and risky
work of urban security to residents of the urban periphery. In the process, the
political responsibility to solve the city’s problems is formally passed directly to
these already-marginalised communities. With resources and infrastructure stretched
beyond their limits, government officials and institutions make selective decisions in the
implementation of security measures. As a direct result, security is simply not guaran-
teed an equal right of urban citizenship: the city centre often receives disproportionate
services from official security forces while security in the periphery is outsourced to
community members themselves. In the overall implementation of municipal security
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measures, a critical factor is the official assessment of a given community’s own par-
ticipation in the security efforts, their own embodied practice of security. This unequal
logic of participation is rationalised through the presumed correlation between cause
for the insecurity and the political responsibility to solve insecurity; it is justified further
through cultural arguments about the presumed organisational abilities and needs of
communities in the urban periphery. I argue that this pattern eventually institutionalises
marginality within the official practices of participatory security in Ayacucho: commu-
nities on the social, economic, and geographic margins are expected to govern their
own security, to volunteer their own time and bodies. As we will see in continuation,
the same is not expected of the urban elite in the city centre.
Documenting Insecurity in the City Centre
Just one day after Ayacucho’s provincial municipality declared a 90-day ‘Citizen Security
Emergency’ in September, 2004, resulting from violence attributed to the city’s nightlife
scene, government officials carried out the latest in a long stream of interventions to
forcefully close several unlicensed nightclubs. The clubs in question were concentrated
along the first two blocks of Jiro´n Asamblea, radiating out from the city’s historic main
plaza. Following explicit and emphatic requests from municipal officials coordinating
the closures, a group of women from the area’s junta vecinal took a public stand,
holding signs and chanting outside the clubs being closed. Towards the end of the
operation, while the State Attorney for Crime Prevention was finishing his report and
the police were still on guard, the president of the neighbourhood organisation was
allegedly held at knife-point by an infamous club owner, who threatened her life if she
continued to press for closures.
The next morning seven members of the junta vecinal (neighbour hood council) went
to file an official report with formal testimonies in the State Attorney General’s Office
(Fiscalía). One at a time, the women took a seat at a large metal desk crammed into the
small room and gave their testimonies. The rest waited on the balcony overlooking the
colonial courtyard, recounting the previous night’s events and sharing their own stories.
Despite the scripted quality to their narratives, it was clear that their personal stories
had not yet circulated within their newly-formed organisation, and although most of
them were long-time residents of the highly concentrated neighbourhood, they hardly
knew one another.
The junta members also intended to talk personally with Jaime Cuadros, the
Fiscal who was present during the incident, hoping to include his testimony in their
report. They were polite but relentless as they returned time after time to request an
appointment, and were repeatedly turned away by his secretary. When Fiscal Cuadros
eventually invited them in, he was cordial but adamant that he would not provide a
testimony, and defensive against their pleas. As they stressed the risks that they ran
as common citizens he interjected continuously, reminding them that he was also at
risk: ‘All of us there last night exposed ourselves, not just you’. The women reiterated
that ‘we are witness to [these problems] and we are here fighting on behalf of the
whole community (pueblo)’, but Fiscal Cuadros snapped back: ‘do you think I’m not
working?’ The conversation ended abruptly, dissatisfying for all parties.
Within the broad participatory security mission, Jiro´n Asamblea and other city centre
neighbourhood organisations were periodically invited to make visible appearances such
as this at municipal events and operations, participating through the act of ‘witnessing’
or ‘being present’ (presenciar). In stark contrast to the participation described for Los
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Olivos, these city centre residents were expected to participate purely through their
presence in official activities, and not through more direct labour or involvement. Junta
members, all the same, considered this to be a risk they took for the ‘good’ of the
city, and they insisted that this role was crucial to the municipality’s success. As they
explained to Fiscal Cuadros, ‘[The mayor] told us that our presence was important
[during the police intervention]. That’s the only reason that we were there!’
Members of this junta, like most members of city centre neighbourhood organisa-
tions, occupied historically influential structural positions in the city’s society, through
which they were socially, politically, and economically capable of putting considerable
pressure on specific authorities. Members often had familial ties to specific acting
officials or relationships with governing political parties and they often had extensive
experience with the hierarchies and infrastructure of local government, comfortably and
confidently moving around the offices scattered throughout the city centre. They could
also apply pressure through the very public and powerful medium of the media, since as
prominent families, important local business owners, and respected professionals, their
complaints and accusations appeared frequently in print, radio, and television news,
and they had the funds to finance personal announcements.
Despite wielding significant public pressure as individuals, however, once organised
into a new junta vecinal they had far less influence, and members often felt that their
efforts were futile and that they were not taken seriously. More palpable still was the
sense that the role of city centre juntas in the city’s security controversies, and the
associated risks, went unacknowledged, even by governing officials such as the Fiscal.
As with other expectations and evaluations of civil involvement in urban security, the
reasons behind this specific relationship can be sourced to the prevailing conceptions of
‘participation’ within government programmes.
As in the scene described, the principle actions of this junta vecinal involved a
particular category of formalised interactions with state institutions: filing continuous
official documents in government offices, such as complaints (denuncias, reclamos) or
demands (solicitudes, memoriales). While some of their complaints were against other
members of civil society (nightclub owners, in this case), the vast majority of complaints
were against specific government officials for not enforcing municipal resolutions and
ordinances and for not carrying out official duties. Parallel to these formal complaints,
they also launched a powerful campaign for municipal accountability, demanding that
officials commit themselves to achieving citizen security. This type of citizen vigilance is
widely endorsed by many NGOs as a crucial tool of democratic participation, fulfilling
the abstract civil responsibility to hold government authorities accountable.
Not surprisingly, inside the municipal offices, participation is defined through
another set of criteria, and vigilance as practised by the city centre organisations is
perceived as an obstacle to valuable collaboration and a hindrance to realising the
municipality’s broad agenda of citizen security. Actions such as filing reports and
demands are regarded not as legitimate forms of participation, but instead as markers
of disillusionment and discouragement. Likewise, accusations by officials that residents
of the city centre don’t participate in citizen security programmes because they have
become too complacent served to deflect attention away from the antagonism with
which city centre organisations met government officials, and highlighted instead that
these juntas did not follow the municipality’s priorities in identifying citizen security
concerns. As a result, these formally registered juntas vecinales received no institutional
support (logistical or material) from civil participation programmes. Alexi Avilez, then-
director of the municipal office of Neighbourhood Participation, justified this decision
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very explicitly by observing that they were too limited to their singular concern over
nightlife and did not work for ‘citizen safety at every level’ (interview, 2005), meaning
that they did not share the same set of priorities outlined in the provincial municipality’s
41 identified factors for insecurity in the city. As long as the city centre neighbourhood
organisations did not share these priorities, and participate in the municipality’s agenda,
then they would receive no municipal support, they would be hard pressed for warm
welcomes from officials, and theirs would not be considered an exemplary form of civil
participation. In practice, within the participatory security programmes, participation
is framed as virtually synonymous with positive collaboration in the implementation of
municipal strategies and physical enforcement of urban security.
Although officials wished that the city centre organisations shared the municipality’s
citizen security agenda, and they were sometimes exasperated by the absence of residents
when the going got tough, in practice there were concrete limits to what was expected
or needed from city centre residents and organisations. They were only invited to
participate to the extent that they could be present in municipal operations; very unlike
organisations in the urban periphery, city centre residents were not expected to take
more direct physical action in the realm of citizen security, such as manual labour or
performing night rounds to watch over their neighbourhoods themselves. By contrast,
such expectations were held of neighbourhood organisations in peripheral areas such
as Los Olivos.
The stark contrast between the participation of city centre juntas vecinales and
the organisations in peripheral communities clearly demonstrates how participation is
narrowly defined and differentially valued – a far cry from the idealised goals of inclusive
citizenship and transparent governance. Instead, with city centre residents participating
through indirect security activities (such as witnessing police interventions) and the
peripheral community participating directly and physically through manual labour and
night patrols, these urban communities are actively embodying inequitable citizenship.
In other words, the discrepancies in how forms of participation are valued serve to
institutionalise inequality by placing disproportionate responsibility upon marginalised
communities. Only by first fulfilling those asymmetrical expectations can peripheral
communities lay full claim to one of the most talked-about (and elusive) rights of urban
citizenship: urban security and safety.
Conclusion: Disjunctures of Participatory Citizenship
‘The Achilles heel of communal prevention programmes’, wrote Lucía Dammert, is the
‘tendency towards exclusion, creating a threatening ‘‘other’’, stigmatised as dangerous
and allegedly legitimised by the community’ (Dammert, 2005: 3). Although Dammert
concluded that this tendency can be countered through ‘the design of inclusive politics
of participation in initiatives that generate higher quality of life for all citizens’,
I have presented instances in which participatory initiatives have had exactly the
opposite outcome. By translating geographies of causal and political responsibility for
urban insecurity into geographies of participation, what I refer to as the participatory
security paradigm has preserved the stigmatised role of the dangerous ‘other’ and thus
actively reinscribed existing social distinctions. Furthermore, through these practices,
pervasive disjunctures in urban citizenship are continually naturalised, depoliticised,
and institutionalised in newly consequential ways.
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Writing about urban security in Bolivia, Daniel Goldstein described how interna-
tional discourses of rights and security appeared contradictory to urban residents of
Cochabamba’s outlying barrios, many of whom demonised the discourse of human
rights as protecting criminals and thus preventing long-term security. The ‘Citizen Secu-
rity’ model was, in this context, intended to strike a new balance: ‘rather than pitting
rights against security, seguridad ciudadana acknowledges security to be a right, guaran-
teed by the state to its citizens’ (Goldstein, 2007: 59). While the dominant national and
international democratic paradigms present urban security as a right of citizenship, we
have seen here that this right is not necessarily an inalienable one guaranteed by the state;
in some instances, official programmes of participatory security have redirected security
to be an earned right of citizenship. Accentuated through glossy posters espousing that
democratic citizenship involves both rights as well as responsibilities, the ‘participatory
security’ apparatus is essentially pitting rights directly against security. In essence, only
the citizens who fulfil their duties – as defined by the official institutions overseeing
urban security – are then eligible to have their demands prioritised and respected by
those same institutions, or, ultimately, to exercise their rights as urban citizens. This
is nowhere clearer than in the careful words of Ayacucho’s then-director of Citizen
Security: ‘any citizen who fulfils his duties is more than welcome to exercise his rights’
(interview with J. A. Antezana, 2007, emphasis in original).
All of this leads to some rather provocative conclusions. First, not only is secu-
rity itself not an unconditional right guaranteed equally to all citizens (in spite of
governmental rhetoric and glossy posters), but the official assessment of a commu-
nity’s participatory commitment was leveraged in a tight calculation of differential,
and differentially earned, rights to municipal support for maintaining urban security.
As a consequence of imbalanced and exclusionary geographies of participation, such
contemporary security programmes are hardly better at responding to the priorities
and needs of marginalised urban residents, let alone bringing about a radical change
towards more inclusionary citizenship. Instead, long-standing social and economic
differences are paradoxically brought to life through democratic programmes of par-
ticipation in local governance. Specifically, these inequalities are ingrained through the
civic philosophy asserting that democratic rights are predicated upon meeting certain
responsibilities.
The idealism of democratic participation is highly seductive, offering the potential
for egalitarianism or horizontality, inclusive cooperation, and the dream that social
inequalities can be remedied, or at least minimised. The disparities in the forms of
participation examined in this article are not simply examples of an imperfect system
failing to meet an attainable goal of inclusivity. Rather, they illuminate some of the
precise mechanisms by which the ideals of democratic inclusion in public governance are
systematically overpowered by the promotion of disparate forms of participation. In fact,
these disparities are only the most current incarnation in a history of formal relationships
with government entities that foster asymmetrical involvement and incorporation of
neighbourhood organisations. These experiences also remind us how highly misleading
it would be to suggest that participation can ever be fully inclusive and equal; it is by
nature filtered through layers of historical relationships and experiences, and as such it
is highly exclusionary. The imbalanced expectations of duties and responsibilities – of
embodied commitment and physical action – mask entrenched social and economic
inequalities. In effect, the contemporary model of democratic citizenship has reframed
the terms of marginalisation through the very practices of participation.
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